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THE IRS PLOWS NEW GROUND IN THE TAX
TREATMENT OF LAND CLEANUP COSTS
ROY WHITEHEAD,* PAM SPIKES,** AND BRENDA YELVINGTON***
L Introduction
Owners of real estate are often required to remove hazardous waste from their
land because of environmental laws or because of a healthy desire to maintain a
clean environment. Further, it is desirable that public policy, as reflected by the
Internal Revenue Service's interpretation of the tax code, at least encourage, if not
actively provide an incentive to clean up land. One of the issues that, until recently
was unsettled, is whether the cleanup costs are currently deductible as ordinary and
necessary repair expenses under section 162' of the Internal Revenue Code or
whether the costs must be treated as a capital expenditure that must be capitalized
under section 2632 of the Code. There are currently few court decisions that
provide specific judicial guidance concerning the tax treatment of cleanup costs.
After procrastinating for several years the Internal Revenue Service has, however,
finally issued a definitive Revenue Ruling concerning the treatment of cleanup
costs associated with removal of hazardous wastes from land
11. Capital Expenditure or Ordinary and Necessary Expense
The distinction between a capital expenditure and one that can be currently
deducted is often difficult and must be based on the facts of each particular
situation. Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows deductions of: "All
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying out any trade or business."4
Even though a particular taxpayer may incur an expense only once in the
lifetime of its business, the expense may be justified as ordinary and necessary if
it is appropriate in carrying on the business, is commonly incurred, and is not a
capital expenditure.' Moreover, as the Supreme Court has specifically recognized,
• Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas.
•* Associate Professor of Accounting, University of Central Arkansas.
•** Doctoral Student, School of Accountancy, University of Mississippi.
1. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
2. Id. § 263.
3. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. (Jun. 2, 1994).
4. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994).
5. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966). Even when, as in this case, the ordinary and
necessary expenses was the cost of hiring a lawyer to represent the defendant against mail fraud charges.
The court quoted language from the 1913 Senate debate on the first income tax bill that, "[T]he object
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the "decisive distinctions between capital and ordinary expenditures are those of
degree and not of kind,"6 and a careful evaluation of the facts of each case is
required.7 In determining whether current deduction or capitalization is the
appropriate tax treatment for any particular expenditure, it is important to consider
the extent to which the expenditure will produce a significant future benefit.'
In contrast, section 263 of the Code allows no deduction for a capital
expenditure - an "amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improve-
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."9
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a business expense or
a capital expenditure concerns the timing of the taxpayer's cost recovery. While
business expenses are currently deductible, a capital expenditure usually is
amortized and deprec iated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific
asset or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the
enterprise.
Section 1.162-4 of the Regulations dealing with the repairs, states:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value
of property nor appreciably prolong its life but keep it in ordinary
efficient operating condition, may be deducted as an expense ....
Repairs in the nature of replacements, to the extent that they arrest
deterioration or appreciably prolong the life of the property, shall be
capitalized and depreciated .... ."
Thus, it appears that the two key issues raised by the Regulations that must be
examined in connection with any expenditures for cleanup costs are whether the
property's life is appreciably prolonged, or whether the value of the property has
materially increased as a result of the- expenditure. If neither of these conditions
is present, and if the expenditure merely restores the property or keeps it in an
efficient operating condition, it is a maintenance or repair expense and is therefore
deductible."
On the issue of whether an expenditure adds to or increases the value of
property, the tax court has ruled that the proper test is to compare the value after
the repair has been completed with the value prior to the existence of the condition
necessitating the repairs, and not with the value immediately prior to the making
of the repair. 2
of this bill is to tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he has at the end of the year after deducting
from his receipts his expenditures or losses." Id.
6. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933).
7. Id. The Court decided that payment of debts without legal obligation to heighten one's
reputation is, rather than being ordinary, to a degree is extraordinary, and disallowed a deduction. Id.
8. Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
9. I.R.S. § 263 (1994).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1 162-4 (1994).
11. Plainfield-Union Water Co., v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 337 (1962).
12. Id.
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Concerning the second issue or requirement for an expenditure to be capitalized
is whether it appreciably or substantially prolongs the useful life of the property.
The Tenth Circuit has indicated that there is no absolute rule requiring the
automatic capitalization of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a benefit
enduring for a period in excess of one year. 3
III. The IRS and Cleanup Costs
As previously indicated, there appear to be few cases or rulings directly
involving land cleanup costs. On February 26, 1992, however, the Supreme Court
decided a case that the IRS adopted as analogous to a land cleanup case. In
Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner4 , the Court held that a taxpayer has the burden of
showing that costs for investment banking fees and expenses incurred during a
friendly acquisition are not capital in nature and deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses. Citing Commissioner v. Lincoln Savs. and Loan
Ass'n5 , the Court set out a five part test to qualify for a deduction under section
162(a) of the Code.'6 The Court stated "an item must (1) 'be paid or incurred
during the taxable year,' (2) 'be for carrying on any trade or business,' (3) 'be an
expense,' (4) 'be a necessary expense,' (5) 'be an ordinary expense." 7 The Court
went on to state that the term "necessary" imposes "only the minimum requirement
that the expense be appropriate and helpful for the development of the taxpayer's
business.""
Prior to June, 1994, the IRS had issued two Technical Advice Memorandums
(TAMs) on specific cleanup costs that were disappointing to most taxpayers. 9
While the TAMs did not address the broad issue of environmental cleanup costs,
they did provide the rationale the IRS initially adopted in determining capitaliza-
13. United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (10th Cir. 1968), where the court stated,
mhis concept [the one-year rule] has received rather wide acceptance, and we are urged
to make arbitrary application of it here. We think, however, that it was intended to serve
as a mere guidepost for the resolution of the ultimate issue, not as an absolute rule
requiring the automatic capitalization of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a
benefit enduring for a period in excess of one year.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). The IRS used the case for two propositions. First, that deductions are
exceptions to the norm of capitalization, and secondly, for the proposition that the determination of
whether an expenditure is capital requires an inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits resulting
from the expenditure.
15. 403 U.S. 345 (1971) (holding that the creation of a separate and distinct asset may be a
sufficient condition for classification as a capital expenditure, not that it is an absolute prerequisite to
such classification).
16. Jndopco, 503 U.S. at 83.
17. Id. at 84.
18. Id. at 85. The Court went on to say that Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that
a taxpayers expenditure that "serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset should be
capitalized." Id.
19. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40004 (June 29, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
1995]
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tion versus current deductibility issues." On June 2, 1994, the IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 94-38 relating to the tax treatment of certain hazardous waste land
cleanup costs."' The IRS's position outlined in the revenue ruling represents a
complete reversal on some of the issues from the IRS's previous holdings in the
TAMs.'
In order to fully understand the implications of Revenue Ruling 94-38 and the
IRS's significant departure from its previous position on deductibility of cleanup
costs, the specific facts of the TAMs and the basis for the IRS's holdings are
discussed below. Some of the problems with the IRS's rationale in the TAMs are
also presented. Finally, Revenue Ruling 94-38 is summarized.
Relying on the Indopco case, the IRS first released a TAM concerning the costs
to remove and replaze asbestos insulation in manufacturing equipment.' While
the TAM did not specifically address environmental land cleanup costs, it did state
that the cost of removal and replacement of asbestos in equipment was in the
nature of a capital expenditure because, by eliminating the human health risks, the
expenditures increased the value of the taxpayer's equipment and made the
property more marketable u
In a second TAM, released in February 1993, the IRS revisited the capitalization
of cleanup costs in the context of the cleanup of land.' Although the TAMs do
not specifically addrhess the broad issue of environmental cleanup costs for all
situations, they certainly provide the taxpayer with the rationale the Service had
adopted in determining capitalization versus current deductibility issues.
In the second TAM the taxpayer used a synthetic lubricant in some of its
equipment before 1972 which contained PCBs. The taxpayer was notified of the
PCB contamination in 1972 by the manufacturer and ceased to use the lubricant.
The company, however, was faced with the task of disposing of the waste
generated from the routine maintenance of the equipment. The waste was placed
into numerous earthen pits and trenches on its property.
Subsequently, consistent with its regulatory authority, the EPA required the
company to perform tests to determine the extent to which soil near the pits were
contaminated with PCBs. During this process, it was revealed that the soil was
contaminated. The EPA filed a complaint alleging that PCBs had been illegally
disposed of by the taxpayer. The company and the EPA then reached an agreement
that requires the company to initiate a cleanup program.
In the TAM, the costs anticipated being incurred by the company (relevant to
this paper) include the following: (1) Soil and groundwater assessment to
determine the level and location of PCB contaminated sites; and (2) Soil
20. Tech. Adv. Mern. 92-40004 (June 29, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
21. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (June 2, 1994).
22. Tech. Adv. Meni. 92-40004 (June 29, 1992); Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
23. Tech. Adv. Mern. 92-40004 (June 29, 1992).
24. Id.
25. Tech. Adv. Mer. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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remediation that includes the excavation and transportation of PCB-contaminated
soil and backfilling.
The cleanup program is expected to take several years and cost millions of
dollars. In addition, although the specific figure is not known, the total projected
cleanup costs represented a significant percentage of the book cost of the
taxpayer's system.
The taxpayer argued that all of the environmental cleanup costs are deductible
as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162 and fall under the
definition of "repairs."' The company also argued that the costs are not for the
acquisition of an asset and only provide needed information about contaminated
sites in order to undertake remedial actions. Finally, the taxpayer reasoned that
because the costs were incurred to correct activities undertaken in the past, rather
than provide a future benefit, the amounts should be deducted currently.
The IRS rejected the company's position that the cleanup costs were ordinary
and necessary business expenses under section 162.2' Specifically, the IRS
outlined the four conditions that must be met under section 1.162-4 for a repair
cost to be taken as a deduction.' The four conditions require that: 1) the repair
is incidental;" 2) the repair does not materially add to the value of the proper-
ty; 3) the repair does not appreciably prolong the useful life of the property;3
and 4) the purpose of the expenditure is to keep the property in ordinarily efficient
operating condition.32 The IRS concluded that the taxpayer failed to meet
conditions one, two, and four.3
Relying on Wolfsen Land & Cattle, Co. v. Commissioner,' the IRS stated that
the "costs of the cleanup project are more appropriately classified as capital
expenditures than as maintenance or repair charges."35 In Wolfsen, the taxpayer
incurred the costs of draglining ditches in a farm irrigation system to clear them
of sediment in order to keep the ditches functioning (i.e., to keep water flowing).
The ditches were cleaned out every 10 years rather than every year. The court held
that draglining the ditches constituted a systematic plan that had a significant
impact on the value of the irrigation system and thus, should be capitalized.36 In
other words, the draglining materially increased the value of the property.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994). Section 1.162-4 allows deductions of repair costs when the repair
is incidental, the cost of the repair does not materially add to the value of the property, the repair does
not appreciably prolong the life of the property, and the purpose of the expenditure is to keep the
property in ordinary operating condition. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1994).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
34. 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
35. Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
36. Wolfsen Land & Cattle v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1, 21, (1979).
1995]
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In the TAM, the .RS found the taxpayer's situation to be similar to Wolfsen, in
three ways." First, the taxpayer chose to do an extensive cleanup project rather
than annual waste identification and disposal." The fact that the company was
unaware that its method of disposal would require cleanup in the future was
considered irrelevant to the proper characterization of the cleanup costs. Second,
in both Wolfsen and the present TAM, the costs were undertaken as part of a
systematic plan.3' Third, based on Wolfsen, the taxpayer's property will be more
valuable in its business after the cleanup of the PCB residues.'
As in the first TAM issued in 1992, the IRS rejected the test used by the Tax
Court for determining whether an expenditure increased the value of the
property.4' In Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner,4 2 the tax court
devised a test for determining whether an expenditure increases the value of the
property thus triggering a requirement to capitalize cleanup costs. The court stated
that the property's value after the expenditure must be compared to its value prior
to the existence of the condition necessitating the expenditure in order to determine
if its value was enhanced 3
The IRS distinguished the Plainfield-Union test by concluding that the cleanup
operations were non-essential repairs; that the cleanup operations did materially
add to the value of the property; and that the purpose of the expenditures was not
to keep the property in ordinary efficient operating condition, but to effectuate a
general restoration of the property which should be treated as an addition to the
capital investment."
IV. Ingenious but Inappropriate
The reliance on the Indopco and Wolfsen cases was ingenious but inappropriate
for several reasons. First, recall that the tax court in Plainfield-Union, held that
the proper test is to compare the value after the repair has been completed with the
value prior to the existence of conditions necessitating the repairs, not with the
value immediately prior to the making of the repair." Cleanup costs for hazard-
ous wastes, one should contend, restore the land to its condition and value prior
to the existence of the condition necessitating the repairs and not to the value
immediately prior to commencing the cleanup. In other words, the cleanup merely
restores the land to its original value prior to its contamination. Unlike manufac-
37. Tech. Adv. Mem. § 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Tech. Adv. Mem. § 92-40004 (June 29, 1992).
42. 39 T.C. 333, 337 (1962). In Plainfield-Union the court decided that the expenditures to clean
and restore a water main to its original water carrying capacity merely restored the asset to its original
condition and did not create a new or separate asset. Il
43. Id. at 340.
44. Tech. Adv. Mem. § 92-40004 (June 29, 1992).
45. Plainfield-Unicn Water Co,, 39 T.C. at 337.
[Vol. 48:417
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turing equipment in the first TAM, the value of land prior to its contamination and
its value after cleanup can be objectively determined by real estate appraisals.
Second, concerning the issue of whether the cleanup appreciably or substantially
prolongs the useful life of the property, there is no absolute rule requiring the
automatic capitalization of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a benefit
enduring for a period in excess of one year. Given that the cleanup only restores
the property to its original condition, it follows that the taxpayer has not actually
received a benefit enduring for a period in excess of one year because the property
owner only has regained the asset he originally possessed. Finally, even if the
cleanup is considered to be a benefit prolonging the life of the property, the Wehrli
case indicates that there is no absolute rule requiring an automatic capitalization
of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period
in excess of one year and that the question is one of fact for the court. The one
year rule discussion in the case was merely a guidepost rather than an absolute
rule.
Third, from a public policy perspective, the Internal Revenue Service's position
creates a very practical disincentive that will result in the avoidance or delay of the
cleanup of land. Given the position of the current national administration on
environmental policy, landowners can expect greater opportunities to make
contributions in the area of cleanup costs and should be encouraged to make those
contributions voluntarily. Fourth, the IRS position that the property is somehow
made more valuable because of the cleanup cannot be objectively supported. The
more rational position is that the land is no more valuable than it would have been
had not the hazardous waste condition occurred. The logical test, supported by the
Plainfield-Union case, is to compare the value after the cleanup with the value
prior to the existence of the condition necessitating the cleanup.47
Fifth, the costs associated with cleanup costs should be considered as "ordinary
and necessary expenses," deductible under section 162(a) because they are
necessitated by governmental and environmental policy.48 The purpose of the cost
is to properly utilize the land and protect the public rather than to create a more
valuable asset.
Sixth, the cleanup costs should be capitalized only if they produce a new and
distinct stream of income that could not have been generated by the real estate in
its condition prior to the existence of the condition necessitating the cleanup.
Finally, there is a striking analogy between environmental cleanup costs and the
tax treatment of land reclamation costs in the mining context. Costs incurred to
reclaim mining land are clearly deductible under tax court decisions.49 After all,
46. United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
47. Plainfield-Union Water Co., 39 T.C. at 341.
48. For example, to comply with the requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West. Supp. 1995).
49. Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981), allowed a deduction for the
costs of reclamation of land that had been strip-mined relying in part on the fact that government
regulations required the expenditure.
19951
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the cleanup is a mere mending of the property rather than an addition to its value
for its highest and best use."
V. The IRS Plows New Ground
There were numerous flaws in the IRS's arguments that supported its position
concerning capitalization of cleanup costs. It appears that the IRS has, at least in
part, corrected its approach to land cleanup costs in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
The facts outlined in Revenue Ruling 94-38 are very similar to the facts present
in the second TAM. The taxpayer was faced with the need to conduct a soil and
groundwater assessment and conduct soil remediation including excavation and
removal of contaminated soil.
In Revenue Ruling 94-38, the taxpayer was an accrual basis corporation that
operated a manufacturing plant purchased in 1970. Due to manufacturing
operations, hazardous waste was discharged, and the taxpayer buried the waste on
portions of its land. In 1993, to comply with federal, state, and local environmental
requirements, the taxpayer undertook soil and groundwater remediation procedures
and established a system for the continued monitoring of the groundwater to ensure
the remediation had removed all hazardous waste. The taxpayer also began
constructing groundwater treatment facilities to extract, treat, and monitor
contaminated groundwater.
An important fact stipulated in the revenue ruling is that "the effect of the soil
remediation and groundwater treatment will be to restore (the taxpayer's) land to
essentially the sarn- physical condition that existed prior to the contamination."52
This was the exact situation outlined in the second TAM where the IRS concluded
that the costs should be capitalized.53 The IRS's holding in the revenue ruling,
however, is completely opposite, and appears to remove the economic disincentives
of the previous pos ition.
Based on the circumstances presented in the revenue ruling, the IRS concluded
that the costs incurred to cleanup land and to treat groundwater, that a taxpayer
contaminated with hazardous waste from its business, are deductible by the
taxpayer as ordinary and necessary business expenses under Internal Revenue Code
50. Wehrli, 400 F.2d at 689, characterizes a "repair" as an expenditure to restore to a sound state
or mend one which keeps the property in an ordinary efficient operating condition and does not add to
the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life. The court also states that whether the life of
the asset is prolonged is a question of fact. Id.
51. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (June 2, 1994). The ruling specifically stated that the
expenditures incurred by the taxpayer represented necessary and ordinary expenses within the scope of
§ 162 of the code. I.R.C. § 162 (1994). The cleanup of the land did not produce permanent benefits to
the taxpayer within the scope of §263 of the code. Id. § 263. The ruling cites, and appears to adopt, the
holding of Plainfield-Union at least to the extent that the cleanup did not increase the value of the land
when compared to its value in its original condition. Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 333, 340 (1962).
52. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (June 2, 1994).
53. Tech. Adv. Mcm. 93-15004 (Dec. 17, 1992).
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(IRC) section 162 .' The costs attributable to the construction of groundwater
treatment facilities are capital expenditures under section 263(a) of the Code.'
In the revenue ruling, the IRS first stated that the IRC "generally endeavors to
match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are
properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income
for tax purposes."' In addition, relying on Indopco, the IRS acknowledged that
in determining whether expenditures may be currently deductible or capitalized, it
is important to consider the extent to which the expenditure will produce
significant future benefits.'
Applying the above points to the taxpayer's situation, the IRS held that the soil
remediation expenditures and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures "do not
produce permanent improvements to [the taxpayer's] land within the scope of IRC
Sec. 263(a)(1) or otherwise provide significant future benefits.""8 Furthermore, the
ruling concluded that the appropriate test for determining whether the expenditures
increase the value of property is the test outlined in Plainfield-Union.' In
evaluating the potential increase in value to the taxpayer's land due to the soil
remediation costs, the IRS concluded that the taxpayer "merely restored its soil and
groundwater to their approximate condition before they were contaminated by [its]
manufacturing operations."'
In the ruling, the IRS also supports the current deduction for the soil remediation
expenditures and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures by indicating that
the costs are not subject to capitalization under IRC section 263(a)(2) because the
contamination was not present when the property was acquired. Deductions were
also justified because the land was not subject to an allowance for depreciation,
amortization, or depletion.6' Finally, the IRS concluded that the expenditures
(other than the costs attributable to the construction of facilities) are "appropriate
and helpful in carrying on [the taxpayer's] business and are commonly and
frequently required in [the taxpayer's] type of business."'
As expected, the IRS concluded that the groundwater treatment facilities
constructed by the taxpayer have a useful life beyond the taxable year in which
they are constructed.' Consequently, these costs are capital expenditures under
IRC section 263(a)." In addition, the taxpayer is required to capitalize the direct
54. I.R.C. § 162 (1994).
55. Id. § 263(a).
56. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. (Jun. 2, 1994).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 341 (1962).
60. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. (Jun. 2, 1994).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. I.R.C. § 263(a) (1994).
19951
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costs and a proper share of allocable indirect costs of constructing these facilities
under IRC section 263A.'
Conclusion
The change in position of the IRS on cleanup costs has corrected the economic
disincentive present in its former position. Taxpayers (at least taxpayers in similar
circumstances discussed in this article) who voluntarily comply with environmental
laws may now currently deduct their expenses. The IRS' decision to correct the
economic disincentives created by its position in the previous TAMS is good
public policy for both the taxpayers involved and the general public.
65. Id.
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